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A prominent way of justifying civil disobedience is to start from the idea that 
there is a pro tanto duty to obey the law and to argue that the considerations 
that ground this duty sometimes justify forms of civil disobedience.1 The 
basic idea is that we have a duty to obey the law that derives from certain 
important substantive or procedural values that are secured by compliance. 
However, even societies like ours, which seem reasonably just such that this 
pro tanto duty to obey the law holds, are likely to fall short of the substantive 
or procedural values that they aim to deliver. And while it will often be feasible 
to address these shortcomings within the bounds of the legal system, sometimes 
the only effective way of doing so will involve engaging in certain types of 
illegal political activities. Disobeying the law may be the best way of realizing 
the substantive or procedural values that underpin the duty to obey the law. 
Under these circumstances, disobedience may be justified.2
Proponents of this view take for granted that, in societies that are reasonably 
just, only civil forms of disobedience are capable of being justified in this way. 
According to the Bedau (1961) definition that gained significant influence 
through John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice (1999), civil disobedience consists of 
“a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually 
done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the 
government” (p. 320). While certain aspects of this definition can be (and have 
been) challenged (e.g. Morreall, 1976; Moraro, 2007; Brownlee, 2012; 
Celikates, 2014, just to name a few), the key idea is that disobedience is 
1 Some argue that there is a moral right to engage in civil disobedience (e.g. Brownlee, 
2012; Dworkin, 1978; Lefkowitz, 2007). These accounts are beyond the scope of this 
chapter. However, I am inclined to believe that my argument can be extended to those 
accounts: the grounds of the right to civil disobedience would most likely extend to support 
certain (though perhaps a more limited range of ) acts of uncivil disobedience.
2 I avoid taking a stand on whether different forms of disobedience are justified as merely 
permissible or obligatory. This is an important issue, but beyond of the scope of this chapter.
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justified only when it meets some requisite standard of civility, however 
construed. Activities that fail to meet this type of threshold can never be 
justified.
Let us call this the Orthodox View.3 The Orthodox View comprises 
two theses:
Positive Thesis: It is justified to engage in civil disobedience within a 
reasonably just society insofar as and because doing so constitutes 
responding correctly to the considerations that ground the pro tanto duty 
to obey the law.
Negative Thesis: It is never justified to engage in uncivil disobedience 
within a reasonably just society.
The aim of this chapter is to argue that there is something unstable about 
the Orthodox View. Engaging in certain kinds of uncivil disobedience—
disobedience that fails to meet one or more of Rawls’s criteria or civility, 
however broadly construed by critics of Rawls—within a reasonably just 
society also sometimes constitutes responding correctly to the considerations 
that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law.4 So, if it is sometimes justified 
to engage in civil disobedience within a reasonably just society because doing 
so constitutes responding correctly to the considerations that ground the 
pro tanto duty to obey the law, then it is also sometimes justified to engage 
in uncivil disobedience within a reasonably just society, all else being equal. 
If the Positive Thesis is true, then the Negative Thesis is false. In short, we 
should conclude either a) that civil disobedience is never justified within a 
reasonably just society or b) that uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified 
within a reasonably just society. Thus, civil disobedience doesn’t pick out a 
category that enjoys a special normative status over uncivil activities.
3 Proponents of the orthodox view include, just to name a few, Hugo A. Bedau, Martin 
Luther King Jr., John Rawls, Andrew Sabl, Daniel Markovits, and William Smith. In 
addition, activists often endorse the orthodox view. The Occupy Central movement in 
Hong Kong, for example, adhered strictly to nonviolence, and as soon as the movement 
ended, the leaders submitted themselves to arrest. Ordinary citizens also tend to condemn 
activities that fall short of being civil. For example, some dismiss the possibility that the 
Ferguson Unrest in the U.S. can be justified because violence was involved.
4 The term “uncivil disobedience” has been used by Jennet Kirkpatrick (2008) to refer 
to violent political activities such as the interracial abolitionists mob in 1854 that attempted 
to rescue the fugitive slave and Baptist preacher Anthony Burns from being returned to 
slavery under the Fugitive Slave Act of 1850, where one guard was killed during the 
incident. She holds that this type of violent activity shouldn’t be dismissed prematurely as 
“antidemocratic.” That being said, she does warn against how commendable motivations 
can lead to condemnable and indiscriminate violence. My use of the term “uncivil 
disobedience” is broader: any illegal political act that fails the standards of being civil, 
however expansively civility may be defined. Accordingly, political activities that involve 
little or no violence may also be instances of uncivil disobedience.
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This chapter is in four sections. In section 1, I examine a number of different 
versions of the Positive Thesis, starting from Rawls as a key reference point, 
but also incorporating a wide range of non-Rawlsian accounts. In section 2, 
I argue that, if the Positive Thesis is true, then this implies that uncivil 
disobedience is also sometimes justified and, hence, that the Negative Thesis is 
false. In section 3, I consider and respond to the objection that my argument 
ignores the fact that civil disobedience enjoys a special normative status over 
other illegal dissents on account of instantiating certain special features: 
nonviolence, acceptance of legal consequences, publicity, and conscientious-
ness, and thus avoid involving actions that are wrong in themselves. In 
section 4, I argue that my view is distinct from and superior to two rivals: the 
view that we should expand the notion of civility such that civil disobedience, 
expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate; and the view that uncivil 
disobedience is appropriate in but only in unfavorable conditions.
It should be emphasized that throughout the chapter, I do not take a stand 
on whether or why there is a general duty to obey the law. Instead, I simply 
work with the assumptions of different accounts of civil disobedience, and 
show that their justification of civil disobedience vis-à-vis the duty to obey 
naturally extends to justify uncivil disobedience.
1. JUSTIFYING CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
The Orthodox View begins from the presumption that, in reasonably just 
societies, there is a pro tanto duty to obey the law (e.g. Rawls, 1999; Smith, 
2011). This duty to obey is supposed to extend to laws and policies that 
are nontrivially flawed. (Otherwise there would be no point in engaging in 
civil disobedience to fix anything, or there would be no need to justify civil 
disobedience against a duty to obey that doesn’t exist.) But why think that 
there is any duty to obey laws that are far from perfect—say, laws that impose 
systematic disadvantages on certain minorities?
Consider, first, the duty to obey perfectly just laws. There are, broadly, two 
ways of grounding this duty: what I shall call substantive and procedural 
accounts.5 Substantive accounts appeal to certain substantive values that are 
realized through obedience: e.g. responding better to reasons (Raz, 1986),6 
promoting justice through supporting just institutions (Rawls, 1999), or 
5 This dichotomy is employed in order not to over-complicate the discussion. It 
should, however, be pointed out that those who endorse a procedural account still give a 
certain weight to substantive considerations, and vice versa.
6 The basic idea of Raz’s account of legitimate authority is that if, by following the 
directives of some agent or agency, we would better conform to the reasons which apply to 
us in a given domain than through reliance upon our own judgment, that agent or agency 
has practical authority over us.
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fulfilling our “duty to rescue” in a fair way (Wellman, 2005).7 Procedural 
accounts, in contrast, appeal to the non-instrumental quality of the (usually 
democratic) procedures in which political decisions are made. For example, 
the binding force of democratic decisions might be grounded on the fact 
that laws are constraints that we impose upon ourselves (Post, 1993; Markovits, 
2005), or decisions made when all relevant points of views are properly 
considered (Habermas, 1996; Smith, 2011).8
How might we extend these accounts to less than perfect laws?9 Take 
substantive accounts first. Joseph Raz (1986) holds that one ought to obey if 
but only if submitting one’s judgment to imperfect law responds to reason 
better than relying on one’s own judgment. Rawls (1999) holds that the 
natural duty toward justice demands that we support less than perfectly just 
institutions “as long as they do not exceed certain limits of injustice” (p. 311). 
That’s because there is no guarantee that we can establish perfectly just 
institutions, while establishing and supporting institutions represents our 
best chance of approximating a just system. As for procedural accounts, it is 
often argued that we ought to respect others through respecting democratically 
made decisions, even when the outcomes fall short of being perfect.
At the same time, it seems clear that when the quality of the law deviates 
from the ideal too much, obeying no longer contributes to realizing the 
substantive or procedural values that ground the duty to obey. Obeying in 
such cases is pointless if not detrimental. This brings us to civil disobedience. 
In such circumstances, the duty to obey is undermined. As a last resort to 
address serious flaws within the system, civil disobedience might very well 
represent the most appropriate way of responding to the substantive or 
procedural considerations that ground the duty to obey the law. Wellman 
(2005) for instance, states that if a law is unjust and if disobeying it in a 
particular way is effective in a certain circumstance to promote justice, one 
7 Wellman (2005) grounds the duty to obey the law in what he labels as “the Samaritan 
duty”: we ought to rescue others from great peril provided that such rescue is not too 
costly for us. He holds that the state of nature threatens everyone, and can only be 
prevented by establishing a state to maintain order. The burden of supporting the state, 
if fairly distributed through each obeying a fair law, is comparatively small. Given that 
the cost for each individual is small, whereas the benefit of rescuing everyone is great, 
each individual has a duty to obey the law.
8 It is important to point out that this is clearly not an exhaustive enumeration of the 
substantive and procedural accounts of the duty to obey. However, I am confident that my 
analysis can be easily applied to other versions of the substantive or procedural accounts.
9 Some simply admit that once the law falls short of being perfect, the duty to obey 
no longer applies. Wellman (2005), for example, points out that when a law is unjust, it 
either fails to play any positive role in fulfilling the duty to rescue and might even play a 
part in perpetuating injustice, or it places unfair burdens on particular individuals. Either 
way, the duty to rescue is not fairly distributed. Since cashing out that duty fairly is 
exactly what grounds the duty to obey, there is no duty to obey.
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is “morally at liberty to break the particular laws . . . [one] disobeyed simply 
because they were unjust” (p. 86). For example, in a system that embodies 
racial discrimination, some might disobey the law publicly to draw attention 
to the oppression certain groups face and thus enable change. Because 
such illegal activities help to rescue others from immediate and persisting 
harm that arises from unjust systems, in contrast to obeying unjust laws and 
perpetuating injustice, they would actually be fulfilling the duty to rescue. 
Rawls holds that civil disobedience is permissible when dealing with clear 
and blatant injustice such as racial discrimination, and employed as a device 
to promote justice. Those who endorse procedural accounts appeal to the 
quality of the relevant procedures, and hold that democratic decisions are 
not binding if certain groups or individuals were excluded from the decision-
making procedures, and that civil disobedience is justified when disobeying 
actually enables or promotes inclusion (Markovits, 2005; Smith, 2011): say, 
when the voices of certain groups are continuously ignored by the majority, 
and can only be brought to the table through illegal and disruptive activities; 
or when there are bureaucratic obstacles that can only be overcome by imposing 
costs on the system, e.g. inconvenience and public embarrassment, and forcing 
negotiation to take place (Fung, 2005).10
In each case, then, the idea is that civil disobedience is justified vis-à-vis 
the substantive or procedural considerations that ground the pro tanto duty 
to obey the law. Obeying imperfect laws or policies may be pointless if not 
detrimental with regard to realizing these considerations; and civil disobedience 
may better realize these considerations. In such cases, there is no duty to obey 
the law. Rather, civil disobedience is justified.11
2. UNCIVIL DISOBEDIENCE
I shall now argue that if this way of justifying civil disobedience succeeds, 
then it also extends to uncivil disobedience—activities that are somewhat 
10 Note that civil disobedience doesn’t necessarily breach the laws it purports to change. 
Sometimes breaching otherwise perfectly unproblematic laws represents the best way to 
respond to the underlying values that normally demand obedience. Civil disobedience that 
breaches the corresponding laws is labeled “direct” civil disobedience, and that which 
breaches other laws “indirect civil disobedience.” The justification of direct and indirect civil 
disobedience is pretty much identical, so I do not emphasize the distinction in this chapter.
11 I have focused on unjust laws or policies. However, the justification of civil 
disobedience extends naturally to disobeying otherwise just laws or policies: sometimes 
disobeying them, e.g. for the sake of signaling the injustice, also serves the underlying 
values better than obeying those laws. The basic idea is the same: if obeying otherwise just 
laws doesn’t realize the underlying political values, but disobeying them does, those 
values would demand disobedience.
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similar to civil disobedience, but that fall short of the standards of civility by 
failing to be public, refusing to accept punishment, or showing no respect 
or loyalty to the system, etc., and most notably involving violence. Paradigm 
examples of uncivil disobedience include whistleblowing,12 hacktivism, 
ecotage, and the use or threat of violence in protests.13 Whistleblowing, or 
more precisely governmental whistleblowing, defined by Candice Delmas 
(2014b), “involves the unauthorized acquisition . . . and disclosure . . . of 
classified information about the state or government” (p. 78) regarding 
“suspected illegal or unethical conduct . . . [such disclosure] amounts to 
an indictment of the wrongdoing” (p. 80). Hacktivism is activism using 
hacking techniques, “with the intent of disrupting normal operations but 
not causing serious damage” (Denning, 2001, p. 241). Ecotage is “sabotage of 
inanimate objects (machinery, buildings, fences) that contribute to ecological 
destruction” (Vanderheiden, 2005, p. 427). The use or threat of violence in 
protests includes politically motivated vandalism, resisting arrest, threats to 
escalating to more radical measures, and the actual damaging of property or 
harming of persons.14
Note that the discussion of civil disobedience in section 1 was confined 
to cases where civil disobedience was a last resort to address serious flaws within 
the system. A more refined reading of this is that, to be justified, civil 
disobedience must be necessary to address the targeted issue effectively, and 
the costs or harm imposed by civil disobedience must be proportionate to 
the severity of injustice. When it comes to uncivil disobedience, it might be 
12 I follow Candice Delmas (2014b) in holding that whistleblowing falls short of civility, 
as it refuses to accept punishment and involves covert planning or even anonymity; but 
I acknowledge that some might find whistleblowing, at least highly idealized versions of 
it, compatible with the norms of civil disobedience. However, the main argument of my 
chapter doesn’t rest on whether whistleblowing is civil, and I am confident that those who 
insist that whistleblowing is civil would agree that other activities, especially those that 
involve violence, are uncivil, and this would suffice for the argument in this chapter to work.
13 This list is clearly non-exhaustive, but should serve the purpose of discussion. I will 
omit cases such as secret tax evasion to dissociate with unjust governments or draft dodging 
when facing unjust wars, which are traditionally labeled as “conscientious refusals” or 
“conscientious objections.” There seem to be well-developed and widely accepted accounts 
regarding such activities.
14 Here I use “violence” in a broader sense, as Bedau (1961) did when he discussed the 
nonviolent condition of civil disobedience, which includes “deliberately destroying 
property, endangering life and limb, inciting to riot (e.g., sabotage, assassination, street 
fighting)” (p. 656). I am well aware that there is a fair amount of equivocation that occurs 
when this term is used, and it is an inexcusable (and arguably often a malicious) mistake 
to equivocate these different senses when engaging in normative arguments. In order to 
avoid this mistake, I will single out violence in a narrower sense—against persons—and 
have in-depth discussion thereon immediately after discussing violence against property 
in section 2.1. My argument, therefore, can also appeal to those who view only violence 
in a narrower sense as genuine violence.
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thought that uncivil activities are likely to be much costlier than civil activities. 
Thus, uncivil disobedience, even if necessary to realize significant value(s) 
effectively, may never be proportionate, and thereby never permissible.
However, the claim that uncivil disobedience is likely to be much costlier 
than civil disobedience is simply false. Certain forms of uncivil disobedience 
impose much lower costs on persons or society in general in comparison to 
civil disobedience. Whistleblowing, for example, often causes at most public 
embarrassment to the government, but that can hardly be counted as being 
harmful in any meaningful sense. Politically motivated vandalism indeed 
destroys public property, but the costs it imposes are far outmatched by 
instances of civil disobedience that aim at causing large-scale inconvenience, 
e.g. occupying and thus paralyzing transportation hubs or even airport runways 
(where the latter can cause worldwide chaos in the airspace).
In addition, even if certain forms of uncivil disobedience impose more 
costs on persons or the society, this doesn’t prevent uncivil disobedience from 
being proportionate. First of all, whether an act is proportionate depends, 
at least in part, on how significant the values realized are. In cases where, say, 
ecotage helps to prevent massive environmental damages that threaten the 
ecosystem or people’s health, or, say, political violence deters severe racialized 
policing or racial violence, the values realized or protected are substantial, and 
thus speak in favor of those acts being proportionate. Second, and perhaps 
more importantly, it matters to proportionality exactly who bears the costs 
of particular actions. Regarding the ethics of self-defense and war, it is widely 
accepted that when it comes to the distribution of costs, it is better for those 
who are more responsible for the wrong being addressed to bear the costs in 
addressing that wrong; moreover, proportionality allows more costs to be 
distributed to the culpable—those who freely and knowingly engage in 
the wrongful activities that necessitate defensive actions—in comparison to 
their innocent counterparts (Bazargan, 2014; Draper, 2016; Montague, 2010; 
Tadros, 2011, 2012; Vallentyne, 2011, 2016). Applying this to uncivil 
disobedience, even if such activities sometimes cause much more overall 
harm, insofar as the harm is directed at those who are culpable, acts of uncivil 
disobedience can still be proportionate. This can be true of a variety of instances 
of uncivil disobedience, ranging from ecotage targeting industries that poses 
severe threats to the environment, to political violence that responds to racial 
violence, or a wide range of possible disruptive actions that can be taken against 
those who profit from selling firearms and/or from opposing gun control. 
In contrast, acts of uncivil disobedience that impose indiscriminate costs on 
others are more likely to be ruled out by proportionality. (Taking this into 
consideration, one might even suspect that acts of uncivil disobedience that 
target the culpable are much more preferable in comparison to acts of civil 
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disobedience that impose costs on people indiscriminately, as proportionality 
would more likely rule that the costs be imposed on the culpable.)15
Having established the possibility that uncivil activities might be propor-
tionate even if they might be thought to be much costlier, I will now spell out 
the implications of the substantive and procedural versions of the Orthodox 
View for the justifiability of uncivil disobedience.
2.1. Substantive Justifications
First consider substantive accounts. They hold that under special circumstances 
engaging in civil disobedience, rather than obeying the law, constitutes the 
best way of realizing the substantive values that ground the pro tanto duty 
to obey the law. In the following, I shall show that this can and should be 
extended to uncivil disobedience. That is, under other special circumstances, 
it is the case that engaging in uncivil disobedience, rather than obeying the 
law or engaging in civil disobedience, constitutes the best way of realizing 
the substantive values that ground the pro tanto duty to obey the law, namely 
the value of responding to reasons better, fulfilling our duty to rescue, or 
acting upon our general duty to promote justice. Where this is so, it seems 
clear that we should conclude that uncivil disobedience is indeed justified.
As we saw above, paradigm types of uncivil disobedience include whistle-
blowing, hacktivism, ecotage, and the use of violence in protests. These 
types of activities involve breaking laws prohibiting the leakage of classified 
information, laws governing cyberspace, property laws or laws specifically 
introduced to target “eco-terrorism,” or laws prohibiting the use of violence 
against property, persons, or the police. Under many “normal” circumstances, 
obeying these laws will presumably contribute to the realization of the desirable 
substantive ends. But there is no reason to think that this will always be so.
15 One can also understand this issue in terms of the distinction between narrow and 
wide proportionality introduced by Jeff McMahan (2009). Accordingly, wide proportionality 
is about defensive harm imposed on those who are not liable, while narrow proportionality 
concerns those who potentially are. The weight of the harm with regard to narrow 
proportionality is typically discounted in virtue of the target’s liability; for the target has 
forfeited her rights against being harmed, and thus the harm doesn’t wrong her (in contrast 
to being merely permissible but nevertheless wronging the target). This permits more 
harm to be imposed on the liable in comparison to their innocent counterparts, all other 
things being equal. The worry that uncivil disobedience is costlier and thus never 
proportionate might in part be a confusion that all the costs must be treated as rights-
infringements, weighted equally in proportionality calculations. Rather, in at least some 
cases the extra costs are imposed on individuals who are liable to bear them, and so do 
not count against the wide proportionality of the disobedience.
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Consider governmental whistleblowing. To reiterate, governmental whistle-
blowing is “the unauthorized  acquisition . . . and disclosure . . . of classified 
information about the state or government” (Delmas, 2014b, p. 78) that 
involves state injustice. Obeying the law and concealing such secrets might 
eliminate the possibility of correcting, punishing, or preventing severe 
wrongdoings. The cases of Chelsea Manning16 and Edward Snowden17 fall 
into this category. In such cases, obeying the law would seem to be positively 
detrimental to the substantive values underpinning the law, while whistle-
blowing would seem to contribute most effectively to the realization of these 
values. Correcting and punishing seriously unjust activities seems to amount 
to responding to reason better and to promoting justice, while preventing 
severe wrongdoings would be demanded by our duty to rescue, especially 
when the wrongdoings endanger people’s lives. Whistleblowing, therefore, 
under special but realistic circumstances, would seem to be justifiable vis-à-vis 
the duty to obey by being demanded by the substantive sources of our 
political obligations.
Hacktivist techniques include paralyzing websites through virtual sit-ins, 
denial-of-service (DoS), or distributed-denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks, 
site defacements, site redirections, and information theft (Hampson, 2012). 
There are laws prohibiting most if not all of these techniques in many countries. 
Again, obeying these laws would amount to giving up a wide range of useful 
strategies in engaging in protests and forfeiting numerous opportunities to 
promoting justice. Site defacements and site redirections can raise awareness 
of certain issues or even provide (counter-) information against problematic 
organizations and their websites.18 Information theft can also be a form of 
whistleblowing.19 Though hacking techniques can be used for selfish purposes 
and cause severe harm to society, or sometimes represents nothing more 
than a simple display of the hacker’s expertise, if used properly, they can help 
promote the substantive values that otherwise demand obedience better 
16 Manning leaked a large amount of classified information regarding the U.S.’s 
military conduct, including the slaughter of non-combatants. See, for example, Rizzo, 
J.  (2012). Bradley Manning charged. CNN. http://security.blogs.cnn.com/2012/02/23/
bradley-manning-charged.
17 Snowden revealed information regarding NSA’s mass-surveillance programs, including 
PRISM. See, for example, Andrews, S., Burrough, B., & Ellison, S. (2014). The Snowden 
saga: A shadowland of secrets and light. Vanity Fair. http://www.vanityfair.com/news/
politics/2014/05/edward-snowden-politics-interview.
18 For example, in 1999 Anonymous redirected the “traffic intended for a KKK Web 
site to Hatewatch” (Himma, 2007, p. 88).
19 For example, in 2010 the hacktivist Andrew “weev” Auernheimer exposed AT&T’s 
security breach (Delmas, 2018). He was later sentenced to forty-one months. See https://
www.wired.com/2013/03/att-hacker-gets-3-years.
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than obeying the law. Thus, hacktivism can be justified vis-à-vis the duty to 
obey the law.
What about the use or threat of violence against either property or persons? 
The thought that resorting to violence can be in line with the grounds of our 
duty to obey the law might seem counterintuitive. The private use of violence 
seems to be one of the most dangerous threats to social order. It often incites 
retaliation, which leads to more violence, thereby undermining the secure 
and stable society that our way of life depends on. It might also be an 
indication that one has arrogated to oneself the license to behave in ways 
prohibited to others. It is not a surprise that many different accounts of 
our duty to obey the law insist that we do our part in establishing and 
maintaining a civil society that prohibits the private use of violence (e.g. 
Locke, 2014; Rawls, 1999; Wellman, 2005). The use or threat of violence, 
some might conclude, is the exact opposite of what the grounds of our duty 
to obey the law demands.
It is simply not true, however, that under no circumstances is violence in 
line with the grounds of political obligation. At least in certain extreme cases, 
i.e. cases where resorting to violence is necessary and proportionate to bring 
about certain goods, the substantive considerations might demand resorting 
to violence instead of obeying laws that prohibit violence. Frist, consider 
violence against properties and objects. Consider laws banning “eco-
terrorism.” Such laws prohibit direct actions against industries that cause 
serious harm to the environment. Environmental hazards, however, sometimes 
pose significant risks to people’s health. In specific circumstances, successful 
ecotage could help prevent such risks. This might be the outcome of the 
attention ecotage draws, which translates into public pressure, the economic 
costs that destroy the profit of the industries in question, or simply through 
direct prevention or hindrance of environmental hazards. In such cases, it is 
legitimate to ask what the substantive considerations demand. If one endorses 
the duty to rescue as the grounds of obedience, then since such laws prohibit 
rescue, one would have to admit that ecotage rather than obedience is 
demanded. Regarding the duty to promote justice through supporting just 
institutions, in such cases it could hardly be said that institutions are just 
with respect to environmental protection. Since obedience in this particular 
case does not support just institutions, while ecotage effectively promotes 
justice, the latter is demanded by such a duty. In addition, it is simply 
not the case that obeying laws that demand inaction with regard to severe 
environmental hazards that threaten people’s lives would amount to responding 
better to reason. In terms of responding to reason, then, there is no duty to 
obey such laws. Ecotage, if it will genuinely save people’s lives, constitutes 
the most appropriate response.
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Now consider politically motivated vandalism, another type of violence 
against properties and objects. The British Suffragettes, for example, engaged 
in a certain amount of violent activity including smashing windows, blowing 
up mailboxes, and sabotaging telephone lines. They chose to do so because 
nothing less disruptive seemed to work. Such disruption, however, is relatively 
minor in comparison to their disenfranchisement and the disadvantages they 
suffered from disenfranchisement. Or consider the vandalism of political 
symbols in Taiwan. Statues and monuments of the former despot Chiang 
Kai-shek were established long before the democratization of the regime. 
Countless people were persecuted and thousands tortured and murdered 
during the thirty-eight years of the White Terror he initiated.20 This so-called 
“beacon of freedom” personally altered the sentences of a number of 
innocent people to execution.21 The display of political symbols in honor of 
this man, for example praising this dictator as the “savior of mankind,” is 
extremely and unjustly offensive to the victims.22 Based on such beliefs, and 
futile attempts to remove these symbols through legal channels, surviving 
victims and those who sympathize with them underwent several attempts to 
desecrate these state-displayed political symbols.23 In either case, the use of 
violence to pursue just political ends is completely in line with whatever 
substantive values there might be.24
Let’s now turn to the use or threat of violence against persons in political 
protests. There are surely cases where resorting to violence is the only way of 
minimizing unnecessary conflict and casualties. Both legal and illegal protests 
occasionally face police brutality. In normal circumstances, it is uncontroversial 
20 See Huang, T. (May 20, 2005). White Terror exhibit unveils part of the truth. Taipei 
Times. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2005/05/20/2003255840.
21 See Hsiao, A. (May 25, 2015). DPP official urges nationwide Chiang Kai-shek purge. 
Taipei Times. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/front/archives/2015/03/25/2003614346.
22 For the justificatory conditions of displaying political symbols, see, for example, 
Tsai (2016), where it is argued that first of all, the symbol must uphold genuine political 
values, and second, it must be decided through a legitimate democratic procedure. 
Symbols that honor Chiang Kai-shek fail to meet either of these conditions.
23 See, for example, Su, C. & Chin, J. (March 1, 2016). Bust of Chiang Kai-shek 
vandalized in Taichung. Taipei Times. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archi
ves/2016/03/01/2003640556. Similar acts of vandalism occurred constantly and 
regularly throughout the past several years. It wasn’t until late 2017 that the government 
finally yielded to the demands of the people, and started the legislation regarding the 
removal of symbols honoring Chiang and his authoritarian rule as part of the project of 
transitional justice. See, for example, Hetherington, W. (December 7, 2017). Transitional 
Justice Act: Schools named after Chiang Kai-shek to be renamed: education minister. Taipei 
Times. http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2017/12/07/2003683572.
24 It should be emphasized that, as I suggested at the beginning of section 2, there is 
a significant difference between violence imposing costs on the culpable and nonculpable. 
Acts of uncivil disobedience that impose costs on the culpable would be less likely to be 
ruled out by proportionality. Instances of political vandalism that target governmental 
officials who act unjustly or that target unjust political symbols more often satisfy this.
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that an innocent person has the right to engage in self-defense against unjust 
aggressors. However, the belief that activism and civil disobedience in 
particular must be committed to nonviolence might lead one to hold the view 
that the activists and civil disobedients ought never to resort to violence.25 
Once an activist or civil disobedient engages in self-defense, she has resorted to 
violence, and has breached the commitment to nonviolence. Accordingly, her 
action is unjustifiable. But this is absurd. The right to self-defense surely can’t 
be compromised or nullified just because one is engaging in political activities, 
or because the unjust aggressor is wearing a police uniform. Therefore, the 
view that violence must always be prohibited during political protests must 
be rejected. Note that, strictly speaking, such cases don’t fall under the category 
of uncivil disobedience, as legitimate self-defense is typically legal or legally 
excused, and thus isn’t, technically, an act of “disobedience.” But some might 
view a protest in question (legal or illegal) and the violence employed by the 
protesters in self-defense as one single act, and thus dismiss the movement 
as “uncivil” because it “involves violence.” My discussion here is a response 
to those that hold such a view: if this counts as “uncivil disobedience,” so be 
it, but this shows that uncivil disobedience is actually justifiable.
I’ve argued that the case of violent self-defense in political protests should 
at least not be in conflict with the substantive values that otherwise demand 
us to obey the law. In addition to self-defense, the use or threat of violence 
can sometimes promote substantive values more directly. The Ferguson Unrest 
might be one instance: the violence involved, e.g. violently resisting arrest 
or threatening to resort to retaliatory activities, demonstrates and forces the 
public to acknowledge the seriousness of racially biased law enforcement 
and abuses of power that are more often left unprosecuted (Hooker, 2016). 
The angry reaction from activists, some of which manifested in the form of 
riots, against systematic racist police violence following the rape of Théo in 
France is another instance. Without the more radical movements, severe 
police misconduct would more likely receive less than fitting punishment, 
for example charges against police officers for rape would have been reclassified 
as mere aggravated assault.26 In such cases, obeying laws prohibiting violence 
doesn’t fulfill the duty to rescue, doesn’t support just institutions, and 
doesn’t respond to reason better than direct action. There is, therefore, no 
duty to obey such laws in such circumstances; resorting to violence, instead, 
would be demanded by the sources of our political obligations.
25 Hugo Bedau (1961) defended exactly this position: “[the civil disobedient] does 
not respond with violence or violent resistance during the course of his disobedience, 
regardless of the provocation he may have, and thus . . . he is prepared to suffer without 
defense the indignities and brutalities that often greet his act” (p. 656).
26 See McQueen, F. (2017). A horrific accusation against police reignites anger in Paris 
suburbs. The Conversation. https://theconversation.com/a-horrific-accusation-against- 
police-reignites-anger-in-paris-suburbs-73314.
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There is yet another way violence can contribute to the realization of the 
substantive grounds of our political obligation. Violent groups often “work 
in concert” with their nonviolent counterparts. This can lead to a positive 
radical flank effect; that is, the bargaining position of the nonviolent groups 
is strengthened in virtue of the presence of violent alternatives (Haines, 1984). 
Accordingly, the presence of violent groups increases the awareness of the 
issue(s) nonviolent groups attempt to address, as both groups aim at addressing 
the same issue(s). In addition, the presence of genuine violence helps people 
recognize that nonviolent groups are genuinely nonviolent. This prevents 
nonviolent groups from being mislabeled as violent, and helps them avoid 
the backlash and aversion violent activities typically face. Moreover, since 
the government and the majority would worry that the failure of nonviolent 
approaches would drive people to join violent campaigns, negotiating with 
nonviolent groups would appear to be the better option. This kind of “good 
cop, bad cop” interaction occurred during the Civil Rights Movement when 
Martin Luther King Jr.’s nonviolent campaign seemingly conflicted with the 
violent approach of Malcolm X, as well as nowadays in certain environmental 
movements where the radical activists “assist” the mainstream nonviolent 
organizations by being there and being violent (Vanderheiden, 2005). It’s easy 
to overlook the contribution of violence. The Civil Rights Movement, most 
notably, has often been presented in a sanitized fashion, where the “success” is 
attributed primarily or even solely to the nonviolent campaigns (Hooker, 2016). 
This obsession with nonviolence is a mistake, to say the very least. The strategic 
use of violence, or at least maintaining the availability of violent alternatives, 
can contribute significantly to the realization of substantive values.27
In sum, regarding substantive accounts of the Orthodox View, we should 
conclude that the grounds of our political obligation might under special 
circumstances cease to demand obedience to laws prohibiting certain activities 
or even civil disobedience, but instead speak in favor of uncivil disobedience. 
If civil disobedience may be justified in this way, then uncivil disobedience 
may be justified in the same way.
2.2. Procedural Justifications
What about procedural accounts? They hold that when legal means fail to 
do the job, civil disobedience is justified in virtue of enhancing the quality 
27 According to Coretta Scott King in an interview, Malcolm X intended but was 
unable to visit Martin Luther King Jr. when the latter was jailed in Selma in February 
1965. Malcolm X instead visited Coretta Scott King, and told her: “I want you to say to 
him that I didn’t come to Selma to make his job more difficult but I thought that if the 
White people understood what the alternative was that they would be more inclined to 
listen to your husband.” Accordingly, this “good cop, bad cop” strategy was intentionally 
employed by at least some groups during the Civil Rights Movement. http://digital.
wustl.edu/e/eii/eiiweb/kin5427.0224.089corettascottking.html.
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of decision-making procedures: Ignored or marginalized but important 
points of views are brought to the attention of the public, and this enables 
more inclusive democratic decisions. Might we also extend this argument to 
uncivil disobedience?
Certain types of uncivil disobedience, though failing to meet the standards 
of civility in numerous ways, are mainly communicative, and it is not hard 
to see how they actually do enhance the quality of democratic deliberation. 
Whistleblowing exposes illegal or unjust conduct, and such information is 
necessary for citizens to make fully informed decisions. Similarly, hacktivism, 
ecotage, and vandalism can also be used in a communicative way, often to 
raise awareness about certain issues.28 It is less clear how other types of uncivil 
disobedience, especially those involving coercion, threats, or violence against 
persons, can be consistent with a procedural account. Certain instances of 
hacktivism, such as Anonymous’s cyber-attack “Operation Payback” against 
entities they perceive as being hostile toward WikiLeaks, are more attempts 
to retaliate than to communicate.29 Ecotage is often performed as direct action 
with the primary intention “to make certain present and future acts more 
expensive, and hence to discourage” environmentally damaging industries 
(Vanderheiden, 2005, p. 438). The use or threat of violence against persons 
might seem to be the exact opposite of attempting to arrive at mutually 
acceptable solutions through deliberation. It might thus be held that most 
uncivil activities are incompatible with procedural considerations.
However, the conflict between procedural accounts and uncivil disobedi-
ence is not as stark as it might at first appear. It could, sometimes, be questioned 
whether the laws targeted by uncivil disobedience are really justified in 
the first place, according to the standards of procedural accounts. If, for 
example, laws against ecotage were introduced solely under the influence of 
corporations whose profits would be protected by such laws, while laws in 
favor of environmental protection were never seriously reviewed, laws 
against ecotage simply lack the feature of being the outcome of an inclusive 
democratic decision. Another example would be governmental regulations 
of the cyberspace. It can be seriously doubted whether those who are regulated 
really had a say in the issuing of those regulations (Delmas, 2018). In such 
cases, while uncivil disobedience doesn’t contribute to the realization of 
procedural considerations, it does not conflict with such considerations 
28 For instance, in 1996 hacktivists hacked the homepage of the United States 
Department of Justice and altered the title “Department of Justice” to “Department of 
Injustice,” as part of the protest against the Communications Decency Act (Denning, 2015 
September 8). Vandalism defacing statues and spray-painting messages like “murderer” or 
“BlackLivesMatter” also serve as obvious examples.
29 See, for example, BBC (2010). Anonymous Wikileaks supporters explain web attacks. 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/technology-11971259. Here I leave it an open question whether 
Operation Payback is justified. I’ve employed this example just to show that cyber-attacks 
often aren’t aimed to talk but to coerce.
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either; for the laws that are targeted might be incompatible with the relevant 
procedural considerations in the first place.
Two additional points can be made concerning how to bring certain types 
of uncivil disobedience into line with procedural considerations, even if they 
don’t primarily aim to be communicative. The first is about the enforcement 
and execution of inclusive democratic decisions. There is, to say the least, no 
guarantee that the government will carry out and stick to democratically 
made decisions in virtue of them being made democratically. For example, 
it is quite possible that laws regarding environmental protection or regulations 
concerning permissible policing tactics are completely ignored by governmental 
officials. Moreover, it might be the case that governmental officials are known 
to constantly get away with misconduct, and that no legal measures taken 
by individual citizens, such as protests to expose such misconduct, can get 
the government to stick to the rule of law. Compared to inaction in the face 
of the government’s continuous neglect of the law, direct action, such as 
protecting the environment through ecotage or keeping policing in check 
through the use or threat of violence, might actually amount to enforcing 
the execution of democratic decisions, and hence be more in line with 
procedural considerations.30
The second point concerns the robustness and stability of deliberations. 
According to Locke (2014, secs. 224–6), and more recently revisited by Philip 
Pettit (2012), the government has disproportionate power over the people it 
governs. In order for the people to remain in charge of the government, instead 
of the government having arbitrary power over the people, the people need 
to be ready to rise up and overthrow the government should the government 
forget its place and step outside of its legitimate boundaries. In a similar vein, 
in order for all parties to stick to democratic procedures, instead of those in 
power diverging from deliberation whenever diverging is to their advantage, 
threats and coercions to check and balance their power might be thought to 
be needed. Certain types of uncivil disobedience, e.g. sabotages, hacktivism, 
vandalism, etc., might very well be effective means of imposing costs on 
those who disregard democratic procedures, and keep everyone at the table. 
It is worth noting that, unlike the previous point, this is not about privately 
enforcing democratic decisions, but about ensuring that the honoring of 
democratic procedures doesn’t depend on the goodwill of the government.
30 One instance is the Sea Shepherds Campaigns. Illegal commercial whaling has been 
often done under the guise of legal “scientific research.” Seeing that the international laws 
regarding whaling are often unenforced, Sea Shepherds take the matters into their own 
hands and enforce the law themselves. See, for example, Dryzek (2000, p. 122), Smith 
(2016, p. 166), and O’Sullivan, McCausland, and Brenton (2017).
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Uncivil disobedience, therefore, even if it primarily involves threats or 
coercions instead of providing reasons, can still be in line with procedural 
accounts by making deliberation robust and stable.
All this being said, it is certainly possible that procedural accounts might 
justify a rather different set of uncivil activities compared to their substantive 
counterparts. It is not my intention to settle which account is better or to 
decide exactly which types of uncivil disobediences are justifiable. The aim 
of this chapter is simply to show that insofar as civil disobedience is taken to 
be justified with reference to certain (substantive or procedural) values that 
ground the duty to obey the law, then this mode of argument also extends 
to some instances of uncivil disobedience. In short, if the Positive Thesis is 
true, then the Negative Thesis is false. We should conclude either a) that 
civil disobedience is never justified in a reasonably just society or b) that 
uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified in a reasonably just society.
3. IS CIVIL DISOBEDIENCE SPECIAL?
The above arguments naturally invite the objection that there is something 
special about civil disobedience that serves to distinguish it from uncivil 
disobedience and in virtue of which the former is uniquely justifiable. What 
is this allegedly special feature of civil disobedience?
Nonviolence. The most straightforward possibility is that civil disobedience 
is necessarily nonviolent, while uncivil disobedience might involve violence. 
Some might believe that there is something inherently wrong with deploying 
or threatening violence, such that violence should always be avoided, or at 
least that there is always some sort of “moral stain” left behind even if violence 
is necessary. If this is the case, then it would follow that there is a fundamental 
normative difference between civil and uncivil disobedience.
However, it is quite difficult to understand what this inherent wrongness 
of violence is supposed to be. It is true that violence normally causes significantly 
more harm than nonviolent activities. This makes conditions such as necessity 
and proportionality more difficult to satisfy. It is also true that many activities 
that involve violence, especially those that involve physical harm, are considered 
mala in se, acts that are wrong in themselves independent of the law, for 
example rape and murder (Ristroph, 2011). That being said, there seems to 
be no difficulty in conceiving of cases where violence is completely justified 
and doesn’t fall under the category of mala in se. Justified self-defense seems 
to be an example, even if it involves violence; so is policing according to just 
law. So involving violence doesn’t ipso facto make an act unjustifiable or 
malum in se. In the case of violent uncivil disobedience, the question is 
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exactly whether they can be justified instances of violence. To assume that 
violent uncivil disobedience is inherently wrong, despite the fact that it can 
sometimes be necessary, proportionate, and furthermore promote our shared 
political values, seems arbitrary.
Some might want to say that the state possesses the moral right to 
monopolize the use of violence. Again, self-defense, at least where the state 
is unable to provide the defense, serves as an obvious counterexample. 
Moreover, in societies like ours it seems that at least sometimes resorting to 
violence would be necessary and proportionate. Certain issues might be so 
severe that it would be proportionate to damage property or (threaten to) 
harm people to fix it. The system might furthermore be unresponsive to a 
certain degree to this particular issue and the relevant political movements 
for such extreme measures to be necessary. Thus, even if the state is functioning 
relatively well on other issues, it is highly questionable whether the state 
retains the power to monopolize violence on this particular issue.
It might be thought violence often if not always incites violence and hatred, 
“while nonviolence civil disobedience leaves open the possibility of a just 
harmony in a scale of years rather than generations” (Sabl, 2001, p. 314). While 
I agree that nonviolent civil disobedience can be one way of maintaining “the 
possibility of a just harmony,” it is unclear why the uses of constrained violence 
can’t. When violence is carefully employed to promote just ends, or to deter 
one side from unilaterally abusing violence so that all parties would stick to 
democratic procedures, instances of uncivil disobedience are also making a just 
harmony not only possible but stable. Instances of violent uncivil disobedience 
that are in line with the underlying values of the duty to obey are exactly such 
instances. Thus, they shouldn’t be ruled out just because violence is involved.
Accepting legal consequences. A second possibility is that civil disobedience 
expresses “respect for law.” Civil disobedients improve the law through illegal 
activities, but accept the legal consequences to demonstrate their loyalty 
to the regime (King Jr., 2002; Rawls, 1999). In contrast, people who engage 
in uncivil disobedience, though not necessarily, often attempt to avoid or 
resist punishment.31 It might be said that this distinctive attitude toward 
punishment is what makes civil disobedience uniquely appropriate.
31 It is typical for those who engage in whistleblowing, hacktivism, ecotage, and political 
vandalism to attempt to avoid punishment. This might be because the punishment is so 
severe that it is unreasonable for anyone to be willing to face such punishment. Chelsea 
Manning was sentenced to serve thirty-five years in prison, and served nearly seven years 
(due to being commuted by then President Barack Obama). “Eco-terrorists” are treated 
like genuine terrorists in the U.S. It might also be because some activists just want to 
remain anonymous, as Anonymous’s name suggests. Though I won’t go so far as to 
maintain that those who engage in uncivil disobedience necessarily avoid punishment, it 
should be fair to say that being non-evasive is not a typical feature of uncivil disobedience.
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Two things can be said. First of all, while accepting punishment is one 
way of expressing one’s loyalty to the regime, it is not the only way. Taking 
on great personal costs when exposing state injustice in order to make 
reformation possible, such as in cases of whistleblowing, seems to be just as 
loyal as any case of civil disobedience.32 In addition, if being loyal is nothing 
but bearing and expressing some sort of positive attitudes toward the regime, 
it is unclear why incurring any costs apart from that which is necessary to 
make the regime better is necessary for being loyal. By doing something to 
improve the moral status of the state or enhancing state legitimacy, one has 
benefited the regime more than most law-abiding citizens. If doing more for 
the sake of the regime doesn’t count as being more loyal, it’s difficult to 
conceive what does count.
The second thing is that the reason why respect for law is important is in 
need of explanation in the first place. The most plausible explanation is that 
we express mutual respect through the respect for law. We interact with other 
persons under fair terms of cooperation, and refuse to claim any special 
privileges for ourselves. This, however, is only the case if the system is just. If 
the system incorporates a number of unjust laws, then expressing positive 
feelings and maintaining loyalty toward it would amount to expressing 
disrespect toward those who are systematically exploited. If mutual respect is 
genuinely what grounds the respect for law, when respecting the law expresses 
disrespect toward others, we ought to refrain from respecting the law in order 
to respect persons.33
Certain types of disobedients refuse to accept legal consequences. This 
might render them uncivil, but normatively speaking this seems unimportant. 
One can express respect for law while refusing to accept punishment. It might 
also be the case that one ought not to respect the law. Either way, refusing 
punishment doesn’t by itself render an act of disobedience unjustified.
Publicity. Civil disobedience was traditionally defined as a public act. Some 
might hold that if an activity lacks publicity, it’s uncivil and therefore 
unjustifiable. However, before jumping to conclusions, it should be questioned 
in what sense publicity is conceived to be important, and why.
One way of understanding publicity is to focus on whether the identities 
of the actors were voluntarily revealed. Call this “identity publicity.” Paradigm 
32 Sabl (2001) has made a similar point: accepting punishment suggests a willingness to 
cooperate in the future. However, it was also stated that “if the other costs of disobedience 
are sufficiently strong, and the disobedients show a willingness to incur them in the face of 
great temptation, this may be sufficient to show a propensity to cooperate in the future” 
(p. 319). It seems that this naturally extends to cover uncivil disobedience.
33 Delmas (2014a) argues that voluntarily participating in, benefiting from, and 
maintaining a system that is unfair amounts to freeriding and expresses disrespect toward 
those who are exploited. She further argues that this gives us reason to disobey the system.
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cases of civil disobedience seem to have this kind of publicity. Those who 
engage in such activities openly declare their disobedience, and furthermore 
submit themselves to the authorities. This automatically entails their identities 
being revealed. In contrast, uncivil disobedience might involve people 
breaching the laws anonymously, and furthermore putting effort into 
remaining anonymous.
However, it can be questioned why this sort of publicity is morally relevant. 
One answer might be that disobedients should be legally accountable for 
their actions in order to express the “respect for law.” This is incorrect, as 
I have argued in the subsection for accepting legal consequences. The more 
plausible answer is that people should be morally accountable for their own 
actions, and ought to be in a position to receive moral evaluation in order 
to engage in moral dialogue with the general public. If this is all there is 
to the moral importance of publicity, it seems that identity publicity is 
unnecessary. People can receive moral feedback from the general public insofar 
as their actions are known by the public. They could easily distinguish whether 
the public is referring to and passing moral judgment on their actions.
The importance of being morally accountable suggests another way of 
understanding publicity, something I would like to refer to as “anonymous 
publicity.” Anonymous publicity concerns actions rather than actors. It’s about 
an act being done and being known to have been done, so that the public can 
pass their moral judgment to the actors. The revelation of the identities of 
the actors is not necessary for such moral dialogue to take place.
Anonymous publicity is of moral relevance while identity publicity 
isn’t. Therefore, even if uncivil disobedience is uncivil in virtue of lacking 
identity publicity, it is not thereby unjustifiable as it still maintains anonymous 
publicity.
Conscientiousness. Finally, some might hold that civil disobedience is 
special in enshrining a morally important kind of conscientiousness: firmly 
upholding one’s deeply held moral convictions to the extent that one is 
willing to bear nontrivial costs to dissociate from and alter things one 
perceives as morally unacceptable. Some of the earliest and most prominent 
accounts of civil disobedience define it as requiring conscientiousness (e.g. 
Thoreau, 2016; Bedau, 1961; Rawls, 1999). Perhaps it is this feature that 
distinguishes civil disobedience from “ordinary offenses” or “mere criminality” 
(Brownlee, 2012, p. 18).
Suppose that this is true. Does it distinguish civil disobedience from 
other types of illegal activities that are in line with the grounds of the duty 
to obey the law? The answer, I believe, is no. Consider what a conscientious 
person would do in a scenario where civil disobedience is futile if not 
detrimental, but uncivil alternatives can be effectively employed to address 
the issue. If the person is serious about fixing the problem, she won’t exclude 
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the possibility of engaging in justifiable but uncivil activities. In special 
circumstances, it seems that a conscientious person would blow the whistle 
or engage in certain types of violent activities. It might be true that conscien-
tiousness would demand us to engage in civil disobedience under certain 
circumstances, but it wouldn’t limit us to do so.
Indeed, we can even go a step further, and hold that conscientiousness is 
the mark of disobedience, both civil and uncivil. By being motivated by one’s 
deeply held moral convictions, rather than mere self-interest or recklessness, 
the breaching of law in an attempt to respond to the political values that 
otherwise ground the duty to obey the law is distinct from “mere criminality.” 
This distinctiveness is not solely enjoyed by justified disobedience. Disobedi-
ence can fall short of being justified in a number of ways; most commonly 
because disobedients sincerely hold misguided moral convictions or 
miscalculate the necessity or proportionality of their disobedient actions. 
Nevertheless, these shortfalls don’t prevent unjustified disobedience from being 
genuine attempts of responding to the grounds of our political obligations. 
Thus, disobedience, even if unjustified, should be viewed, and perhaps treated, 
differently from “mere criminality.” Especially in cases where the shortfall 
relates to the miscalculation of necessity or proportionality, we should seriously 
consider what sorts of deficits in the society drove people to engage in acts of 
disobedience, rather than hastily dismissing them as unworthy of our attention.
4. OTHER APPROACHES
I have argued that we should conclude either a) that civil disobedience 
is never justified in a reasonably just society or b) that uncivil disobedience is 
sometimes justified in a reasonably just society. Suppose we assume that 
civil disobedience is sufficiently important that we must reject a). In that 
case we must accept b): that uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified in a 
reasonably just society. It will be instructive to contrast this view with two 
alternatives: first, the view that we should expand the notion of civility such 
that civil disobedience, expansively construed, is uniquely appropriate in a 
reasonably just society; and second, the view that uncivil disobedience is 
permissible under (but only under) unfavorable conditions.
Expanding the notion of civility. A number of philosophers have suggested 
that the Rawlsian definition of civil disobedience is unduly narrow. For 
example, John Morreall (1976) and Piero Moraro (2007) argue that illegal 
activities may potentially involve violence yet still count as civil disobedience. 
In addition to violence, Kimberley Brownlee (2012) argues that justified civil 
disobedience may also potentially involve covert planning and the rejection 
of legal punishment. Robin Celikates (2014) proposed a minimalist account 
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of civil disobedience, according to which some degree of violence, covertness, 
or defiance can be incorporated. This suggests a way of saving the Orthodox 
View: It isn’t the case that uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified, but 
that some of the activities that were dismissed by the Rawlsian definition as 
uncivil instead count as instances of civil disobedience, sufficiently broadly 
construed, and, hence, are perfectly appropriate. Perhaps the Negative Thesis 
is correct after all. Uncivil disobedience is indeed never permissible in a 
reasonably just society.
It may well be right that we should adopt a broader notion of civility and 
interpret the Orthodox View accordingly. This would allow the Orthodox 
View to be more inclusive with respect to the kinds of activities that count 
as appropriate within a reasonably just society. But it is highly questionable 
that there is any plausible broadening that would encompass all the disruptive 
activities we mentioned above. There are clearly limits to what can count as 
civil. And it stretches credulity to suggest that whistleblowing, cyber-attacks, 
sabotages, and uses or threats of violence against persons really count as 
“civil” in any sense of the term that we would recognize.34
In addition, there is something unsavory about this approach. Proponents 
of this view tend to alter or expand the definition of civility to make it the 
case that all justified acts of disobedience just happen to be civil. If a type of 
action that was previously viewed as uncivil (say, because it involves violence 
or refuses punishment) turns out to be justifiable, it becomes civil by 
definition in virtue of being justifiable. This undermines the justificatory 
role of civility. A type of action is potentially justifiable because it’s civil, but 
civil because it’s potentially justifiable. This is simply circular.
In contrast to this approach, my view doesn’t rely on the definition of 
civility. Thus, my view avoids the need to define civility to accurately capture 
all potentially justifiable activities, and, more importantly, averts the risk of 
prematurely excluding potentially justifiable activities due to overly narrow 
definitions. Moreover, my view stays clear of the strategy of re-definition, 
and thereby avoids the risk of running into a circulation.
Uncivil disobedience in unfavorable conditions. The other view that is 
worth mentioning holds that uncivil disobedience is sometimes justified 
in unfavorable conditions. A. John Simmons (2010) has argued that the 
application of Rawls’s account of civil disobedience is extremely narrow: it 
only applies to cases that occur in what Rawls calls “near-just societies.” This 
34 Delmas (2018), for example, argues that hacktivism can’t just be shoehorned into the 
traditional framework of civil disobedience: “To accommodate novel forms of digital 
resistance, what is called for is neither an unreflective application of an ill-fitting and too 
narrow concept of civil disobedience, nor an extension of the latter concept beyond 
recognition. Instead, we need to enrich our conceptual framework and devise additional 
lenses besides ECD [i.e. electronic civil disobedience] to approach these phenomena” (p. 20).
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reaction can be extended to any version of the Orthodox View. The Orthodox 
View only applies to “reasonably just societies.” It might be said that, whatever 
is required to count as “reasonably just,” no existing society is likely to 
meet it. For example, no basic structure of any constitutional democracy is 
anything close to being designed according to the Rawlsian or any reasonable 
principles of justice, and rules governing any cooperative scheme are anything 
but fair. Perhaps the proponent of the Orthodox View is right that civil 
disobedience is uniquely justified within a reasonably just society. But the 
interesting question is not what is appropriate within a reasonably just society 
but what is appropriate within the less favorable conditions that characterize 
the actual societies we live in. According to Simmons and others, there is no 
reason to think that civil disobedience is uniquely appropriate in these less 
favorable conditions. Rather, we should expect uncivil disobedience at least 
sometimes to be justified as well.
Let’s concede that uncivil disobedience is sometimes appropriate in 
unfavorable conditions. The question is whether these are the only conditions 
in which it is justifiable. In particular, is uncivil disobedience also sometimes 
justified in a reasonably just society? Reasonably just societies inevitably 
remain flawed in a number of different ways, and fall short of realizing the 
substantive or procedural values that ground the duty to obey the law in such 
societies. Indeed, civil disobedience will represent the best way of remedying 
some of the flaws, but other flaws, e.g. concealed state misconduct and urgent 
environmental hazards, are better addressed by certain forms of uncivil 
disobedience. Unless we have a separate argument showing that societies that 
are flawed in ways that can only be appropriately responded to by some 
form of uncivil disobedience always fall short of being reasonably just, we 
have to admit that appealing to “being reasonably just” doesn’t exclude the 
justifiability of uncivil disobedience.
In contrast to this approach, my view avoids the need to provide an 
argument supporting why “being reasonably just” excludes the justifiability 
of uncivil disobedience. I’m simply skeptical of whether a plausible argument 
can be made. In addition, this way of rescuing the Orthodox View renders 
the Orthodox View irrelevant: it has no application now, and I suspect that 
it might not ever have any application in any future society.
CONCLUSION
The Orthodox View of civil disobedience justifies such illegal activities by 
appealing to the considerations that ground the duty to obey the law and 
suggesting that civil disobedience constitutes the most appropriate response 
to situations where the quality of the law deviates from the ideal. I have 
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argued that if this approach is correct, it should be extended to uncivil 
disobedience. Exactly the same considerations that, in some circumstances, 
will support civil disobedience will, in other circumstances (that are different 
but not necessarily more unjust), support uncivil disobedience instead. I’ve 
considered and rejected several versions of the objection that there is 
something special about civil disobedience, and distinguished the view from 
two rivals that seek to accommodate some of the same intuitive data in 
different ways.
Thus, we should be skeptical of the privileged normative place that civil 
disobedience is typically taken to occupy in political theory and practice. It 
is a mistake to overplay the importance of standards of civility, whatever 
they might be, when evaluating illegal dissent and considering what sorts of 
actions we should take in response to injustice. What is of fundamental 
importance isn’t whether an act is civil; rather, acts of disobedience, civil or 
uncivil, are justified insofar as they are necessary, proportionate, and represent 
the best way of responding to the political values that purportedly ground 
the duty to obey the law.35,36
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